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The Missing Essential Part
Emergency Provision of Nuclear Weapons for 
R CA F Air Defence Command, 1961-1964
S E A N  M.  M A L O N E Y
Abstract: During the Cold War, Canada acquired aircraft and missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons but no agreement existed for Canadian 
access to those weapons. The Diefenbaker government, elected in 1957, was 
suspicious of anything that might compromise Canadian sovereignty and 
harboured a small cadre of anti-nuclear members in its ranks. During a series 
of incidents, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Royal Canadian 
Air Force deployed five squadrons of CF-101B Voodoo interceptors and two 
squadrons of B o m a r c  B  heavy surface-to-air missiles to protect North 
America as part of the North American Air Defence Command agreement. 
This study examines the three available options for the emergency deployment 
of nuclear weapons to Canada and their viability in light of new information.
D u r i n g  t h e  C o l d  War, Canada acquired aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the midst of these complicated
and expensive processes, the Diefenbaker government was elected in
1.957 and re-examined the Canadian defence programme. Negotiations 
began between the Canadian armed services and their American 
counterparts for access to the nuclear munitions for which these 
aircraft were designed. The negotiations, however, became entangled 
in a mire of political controversy. The Diefenbaker government, 
suspicious of anything that might compromise Canadian sovereignty 
and harbouring a small cadre of anti-nuclear members in its ranks, 
delayed dealing with the issue amid increased attacks by the Liberal 
opposition, who, when in office, had initiated the strategic process
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that demanded the procurement of the aircraft that required nuclear 
munitions.
These deliberations took place against an increasingly apocalyptic 
backdrop. The Soviet Union precipitated an extremely dangerous 
crisis over access to West which threatened to escalate into war. As 
that situation waned, another confrontation emerged in 1962 when 
the Soviet Union deployed intermediate and medium-range ballistic 
missiles and tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba.
During these crises, the Royal Canadian Air Force (r c a f ) had 
five squadrons of CF-101B Voodoo interceptors and two squadrons of 
Bomarc B heavy surface-to-air missiles from the r c a f ’s  Air Defence 
Command (a d c ) dedicated to protect North America as part of the 
North American Air Defence Command (n o r a d ) agreement.
Without a formal agreement between the two governments, access 
to nuclear warheads for these forces was problematic. During the 
course of events, however, provisions for the emergency deployment 
of nuclear weapons were examined by both countries. This took 
three forms : the first was what we would today call “just in time” 
delivery of complete weapons from US bases as a crisis escalated. The 
second called for incomplete nuclear weapons to be stored in Canada 
with the delivery of a “ ‘missing essential part’” from US bases to 
be inserted once warning of an attack was given. The third was the 
deployment of American aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons to 
defend Canada. Up to now, the ability of the US Air Force (u s a f ) 
to implement these options has been obscured by decades of secrecy. 
This present study will examine these options and their viability in 
light given availability of newly available information.1
1 The general outline of the emergency provision arrangements initially was based 
on primary sources requested by the author for declassification and depicted in the 
author’s PhD dissertation “Learning to Love the Bomb: Canadian Nuclear Weapons 
and Cold War Strategy 1951-1970” which was researched and written in 1993­
97, defended in 1998, and published by Potomac Books in 2007. John Clearwater 
notes the locations of storage facilities in his 1998 work Canadian Nuclear Weapons 
(Vanwell, 1998) which according to his website was written while he was employed 
at Department of National Defence as a “specialist in access to information matters” 
but he does not examine emergency provision arrangements in it to the same level 
of detail or place it in any significant historical context. “The Missing Essential 
Part” article takes into account new information developed by the author and is 
an elaboration on the discussion in “Learning to Love the Bomb.” I would also like 
to thank Bill Burr at the National Security Archive for perusing this article and 
providing suggestions.
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CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE 101
North American air defence planning started after the detonation 
of the first Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949 and continued after the 
confirmation that Soviet bomber forces were forward-deploying TU-4 
piston-engine bombers to bases capable of reaching North America 
in 1952-1954. Anticipating that jet bombers and thermonuclear 
weapons would replace them, a series of high-priority air defence 
projects emerged in United States and Canada by the early 1950s. 
These included early warning radar systems, command and control 
and communications systems, fighter-interception forces, and guided 
missile systems.
By 1952 joint discussions envisioned an integrated air defence 
system by the late 1950s, knowing full that many technologies required 
were not mature. The nature of the threat, demonstrated by the test 
of an air-droppable Soviet thermonuclear weapon in 1955, forced the 
planners to undertake these projects simultaneously. Two of these 
involved the nuclearization of missiles and fighter aircraft weapons 
systems. Prior to this air defence forces relied on interceptors equipped 
with machine guns and free-flight rockets. These included the CF- 
100 in Canada and the F-80, F-84, and F-86 aircraft in American 
service.2 With technological breakthroughs in small diameter “sealed 
pit” nuclear weapon designs, it was possible to equip interceptors 
with nuclear air-to-air weapons. Similarly, the surface-to-air missiles 
under development were modified to accept nuclear warheads.3 It was 
by the mid-1950s fully understood in the r c a f  and the u s a f  that 
the next generation of aircraft and missiles would use small nuclear 
weapons as their primary kill mechanisms.
The integration of the Canadian and US air defence programmes 
was deemed to be an American priority in 1949. At the same time 
it was understood in American policy circles that there were issues 
of national sovereignty that demanded delicate handling.4 It was
2 Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of 
Continental Air Defense 1945-1960 (Washington DC: GPO, 1991), ch.6.
3 Previously, nuclear weapons were extremely large “open pit” designs that 
required the in-flight insertion of the plutonium core for them to operate. FOIA, 
“ADC Historical Study No. 21, Bomarc and Nuclear Armament 1951-1963,” and 
“ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition, Control and 
Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963.”
4 This exceptionally complicated historical process has for the purposes of this
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recognized on both sides of the table that the air defence systems 
as a whole existed to protect the u s a f ’s  Strategic Air Command’s 
forces, that the deterrent capability of s a c  rested on the reduction of 
its vulnerability, and the larger issue of deterring aggressive Soviet 
activity generally was based on this deterrent system. However, it 
was simply not acceptable that the United States should take over 
the defence of Canada. Nor did the Americans want to, despite the 
assertions and shrill cries of nationalists in Canada.5
It was thus up to Canada to determine its level of involvement. 
Canada looked at the construction of an indigenous interceptor force, 
purchasing a complementary surface-to-air missile force compatible 
with American systems, and manning some form of integrated 
detection and direction system. By at least 1956 it was evident 
to Canadian planners that nuclear warheads were going to be the 
norm for the air defence system. The accidental release of classified 
Douglas Aircraft reports to Canadian authorities that related to their 
MB-1 Genie nuclear air-to-air rocket contributed to r c a f  interest.6 
By May 1957 active discussion about arming the future interceptor 
force based on the CF-105 Arrow aircraft with MB-1 was underway.7 
This course of action was confirmed when the entire r c a f  leadership 
witnessed Shot j o h n , the live test of an MB-1 Genie nuclear air-to- 
air rocket in Nevada during the Plumbob test series in July 1957.8
As the MB-1 was about to enter service in the US Air Force, 
special care had to be taken for its transport and storage. It was 
not simply a matter of stockpiling the rockets in a hanger on a given 
base. The highly-destructive nature and technological sophistication 
of nuclear weapons required exceptionally specialized transport and 
maintenance procedures. The weapons design had to be safeguarded.
article been dramatically compressed. It is discussed in great detail in the author’s 
Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 
1951-1970 (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2007).
5 US National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] RG 59 file E3077 
250/62/30/3 Box 1 (1 Sep 1961) Canadian-American Relations Committee, 
“Canadian-American Relations"
6 ATI (27 August 1956) memo CCOS to CJS(W) “Air to Air Atomic Weapons” ; (24 
September 1956) memo JSWPC to CCOS, “Air-to-Air Atomic Weapons.”
7 DHH file 79/429 vol. 7A, (1 Mar 57) AMTS “Divisional Items of Interest.”
8 Library and Archives Canada [LAC] RG 24 vol 21444 file 1894.2 (Oct 57) “A 
Report on the Activities Connected with the Formation, Operations and Close-out 
of the Canadian Administration Group during Operation PLUMBBOB 1 May 57-1 
Oct 57 at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada Test Site.”
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Safety standards and accountability were on an order of magnitude 
higher than conventional weapons. A  single person now had the 
capability of generating immense destruction and steps had to be 
taken to eliminate that possibility, thus command, control and alert 
procedures had to be completely redesigned.
As a result, nuclear weapons could not be transferred to the 
r c a f  like conventional weapons as there were stringent legal aspects 
regarding the deployment and use of nuclear munitions. To access 
these systems, and it was not just the warheads but all aspects of 
the nuclear endeavor, required a series of agreements related to each 
type of delivery system. Only then could training commence and 
information on the systems flow between the two air forces. And, 
if the aircraft were made in Canada, they had to be certified for 
nuclear weapons delivery by the appropriate authorities at Kirtland 
Air Force Base in New Mexico. These processes all stalled after the 
Diefenbaker government was elected in 1957.
AIR DEFENCE DISPOSITIONS: THE TYRANNY OF GEOGRAPHY
The first u s a f  interceptors equipped with MB-1 Genie rockets on 
alert were nine F-89J Scorpions at Hamilton Air Force Base (a f b ) 
near San Francisco and six F-89J’s at Wurtsmith a f b  in Michigan 
on 1 January 1957. Twelve bases across the United States were 
surveyed for MB-1 storage, with construction commencing at nine 
locations in 1956. Only four were ready by early 1957 : Hamilton, 
Wurtsmith, Dover in Delaware and K.I. Sawyer in Michigan. With 
the planned deployment of the F-101B Voodoo and F-106A Delta 
Dart interceptors in 1960-61, up to 30 bases in total were scheduled 
for MB-1 storage.9
At the same time, the Bomarc surface-to-air missile system 
entered service. Initially designed to ring the perimeter of the United 
States, the programme was eventually cut back to ten sites, each 
housing 28 missiles.10
One must appreciate the geographical issues facing u s a f  air 
defence planning at this time. American heavy industry at the time
9 FOIA, “ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament: Its Acquisition, 
Control and Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963"
10 Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, ch.8.
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was concentrated in the Chicago -  Ohio Valley and the Michigan area. 
There was also a “high tech” corridor from Boston to Buffalo. The 
s a c  base network expanded to include nine major bomber bases from 
North Dakota to Maine. The US Navy’s nuclear submarine facilities 
were located in New England. To the south was the command and 
control hub, Washington DC. The only route that Soviet bombers 
could take to get at these target complexes was from the Kola 
Peninsula, over Greenland, Baffin Island, Labrador, Quebec, and 
then Ontario. On the west coast, bombers based in eastern Siberia 
were even closer to their targets. To attack the aerospace industry, 
arrayed from Washington state to California, and the myriad of s a c  
bases located in both states, Soviet forces had to cross Alaska, then 
British Columbia.
The complicating problem for the air defence forces were the 
portion of Ontario that jutted southwards into the United States ; 
the proximity of Quebec’s major cities to Vermont; and the location 
of a major s a c  base on the border with New Brunswick at Caribou, 
Maine. Interception of bomber aircraft had to take place as far away 
as possible from the targets, not only because u s a f  interceptors were 
equipped with nuclear weapons, but because the bombers carried 
thermonuclear weapons that could generate irradiated craters two 
miles in diameter. That state of affairs pushed the intercept line north 
as far as possible and produced a requirement to have interceptor 
forces cover those spaces.
The u s a f  sited interceptor forces along the border, with seven 
fighter and Bomarc facilities in Minnesota and Michigan, and six 
more from New York through Maine to Massachusetts. Six fighter 
bases covered the northwest from Washington to North Dakota.11 
The r c a f ’s  Air Defence Command had CF-ioo’s based at Comox, 
BC ; Cold Lake, Alberta ; North Bay and Ottawa in Ontario, and 
St. Hubert and Bagotville in Quebec.12 The r c a f ’s  dispositions gave 
depth on the west coast and to some extent for what became known as 
the “Niagara Triangle.” There were four additional u s a f  interceptor 
squadrons that afforded even greater depth: Thule, Greenland; Goose 
Bay, Labrador ; Stephenville, Newfoundland ; and Keflavik, Iceland. 
Similarly air defence forces in Alaska gave the US west coast depth 
of coverage.
11 Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 230.
12 Larry Milberry, The AVRO CF-100 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1981), 177.
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The thorny issue of deploying MB-1 Genies to overseas bases 
posed questions as to the viability of the four bases on the northeast 
approaches. First, there was the questionable legality of the presence 
of Thule Air Force Base in Greenland vis-a-vis the already aggravated 
Danish-American relations. Second, Iceland, was leaning towards 
neutrality and there were similar sensitivities. Third, the American 
use of bases in Newfoundland and Labrador was a sensitive issue 
dating back to the Second World War. That said, there were US Air 
Force interceptor squadrons stationed at all four locations. Storage 
for nuclear air defence weapons was constructed at Goose Bay and 
Thule.
NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE FOR AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE 
FORCES
Each u s a f  interceptor base contained a nuclear weapons storage 
area and a quick reaction alert facility designed by the Black and 
Veatch Company in Kansas.13 The MB-1 Genies were kept in thirty- 
bay Multi-Cubicle Magazine Storage ( m c m s ) buildings, with one 
MB-1 mounted on a MF-9 trailer in each bay behind an alarm- 
protected “garage door of doom.” Each bay was made of concrete 
with a frangible roof. If there were an accident this would direct 
any blast upwards and localize any plutonium contamination.14 Air 
Defense Command bases with nuclear-capable interceptors generally 
featured four m c m s  buildings (a limited number of bases had three, 
others had five or six) for an average of 120 MB-1 Genies per base.15 
There was also a warhead checkout building. The m c m s s  were built 
starting in late 1956 with construction delays well into 1958 affecting 
operational capability for the Air Defense Command.16
13 HQ Air Combat Command Langley Air Force Base, Virginia “Cold War 
Infrastructure for Air Defense : The Fighter and Command Missions, November 
1999,” 76- 77.
14 Author’s site survey of the former Griffiss AFB Weapons Storage Area ADC 
storage section.
15 Author’s Google Earth survey of former ADC bases in the continental United States.
16 FOIA, “ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition, 
Control and Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963.” See also Bill Green, 
The First Line: Air Defense of the Northeast 1952 to 1960 (Fairview: Wonderhorse 
Publications, 1994), 365.
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One problem associated with MB-1 Genie storage in the m c m s  
structures related to the need to protect the rocket’s propellant from 
freezing. Early m c m s  buildings had to be modified with heating and 
temperature measurement systems. These changes were made at 
Goose Bay; Griffiss, NY; Glasgow and Grand Forks on the prairies; 
Duluth, Minnesota; and Loring and Dow in Maine. Later an electrical 
heating blanket system was incorporated into the MB-1 design which 
allowed the weapons to be “plugged in” in the bays and kept at 
optimum temperatures.17
Four interceptors at each base were kept on alert in a protected 
hanger, one pair with conventional weapons for identification flights, 
and a pair loaded with M B-is in case of bomber attack. Once F -io iB ’s 
took over from the F-8gJ’s the Voodoos conducted identification 
flights while loaded with M B-is.18
As for the Bomarcs, the W  40 warhead was mounted in the 
missile airframe. Each site maintained 28 missiles. A separate 
warhead maintenance building had m c m s -like bays with space for 
eight warheads but it is unlikely that there were more than a pair 
of spare warheads per site. For the Bomarc sites located in the 
northeast, there appear to be no additional storage areas co-located 
with the missile coffin launchers.19 The W  40 warhead was a more 
sophisticated system that had special maintenance requirements. It 
was a boosted Mk 28 warhead which required tritium gas to function 
and thus the gas had to be recharged from time to time as, it turned 
out, it prematurely aged.20
Nuclear weapons like the W  25 in the M B-i and the W  40 in the 
Bomarc required second and third-line maintenance. Designed at 
the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and built at Burlington, Iowa 
and Pantex, Texas,21 it is not clear where the intermediate storage 
facilities that the weapons were shipped to prior to deployment to the
17 Author’s survey of Griffiss WSA. I’d like to thank Larissa Reise for pointing out 
the remains of the temperature control equipment. See also “ADC Historical Study 
No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition, Control and Application to Manned 
Interceptors i95i-i963.”
18 Green, The First Line, 465.
19 Author’s site survey of the North Bay Bomarc site; Author’s Google Earth survey 
of former Bomarc sites.
20 Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York : Orion 
Books, i987), 220.
21 Rebecca Ullrich, “Tech Area II : A History,” Contractor Report SAND98-i6i7 
Sandia National Laboratories, July i998 pp. i i - i2 .
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This screen shot shows the M B -1 Genie. To the immediate left o f the rocket airframe is 
the seldom-seen W -25 warhead. Note its relatively small size. In less than a decade nuclear 
weapons shrunk from the huge Fat Man devices to one capable o f being launched from a 
fighter aircraft. [Author]
operational sites. Eventually, the 3079th Aviation Depot Wing of Air 
Material Command took custody of the warheads. This organization 
maintained operational storage sites co-located at five s a c  bomber 
bases: Loring a f b  in Maine (Site Easy) ; Ellsworth a f b  in South 
Dakota (Site Fox); Fairchild a f b  in Washington (Site George); Travis 
a f b  in California (Site How) ; and Westover a f b  in Massachusetts 
(Site Item).22 These facilities usually catered to the s a c  bomber force, 
but, as more bombers came on line and weapons got smaller, s a c  
dispersed to more bases, each with their own weapons storage area. 
Each of the original Operational Storage Sites contained in excess of 
twenty large storage “igloos,” each capable of holding, for example, 
40 to 50 B-61 gravity bombs. In other words, there was more than 
enough space to house transient W  25 and W  40 warheads in their 
55-gallon-drum-like containers.23
Three transport squadrons that belonged to the 3079th Aviation 
Depot Wing transported the weapons. These were the 28th Air 
Transport Squadron (Special) at Hill a f b  in Utah ; the 19th Air
22 See organization chart for 3079th Aviation Depot Wing, at < www.3084adg.us>.
23 Author’s survey of Operational Storage Sites EASY (former Caribou AFS) and 
ITEM (former Stony Brook AFS).
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Transport Squadron (Special) at Kelly a f b , Texas ; and the 7th 
Air Transport Squadron (Special) at Robins a f b  in Georgia. Each 
squadron was equipped with 15 modified C-124 Globemaster II four- 
engined wide-body transports, manned by specially-trained crews 
who could protect the weapons and stow them so “as not to create 
an incipient radiation problem amongst the weapons radioactive 
materials.”24 The 3079th Aviation Depot Wing was disbanded 
in 1962 and the three Air Transport Squadrons (Special) became 
“Logistics Support Squadrons,” retaining their original numerical 
designations. The three squadrons were then concealed within the 
62nd Air Transport Wing (Heavy) to lower their profile as there were 
some 400 other C-124 aircraft in the u s a f ’s  airlift inventory.
By 1960, the system for handling nuclear weapons was mature 
and there was regular traffic between the production facilities, storage 
sites, and interceptor squadrons. At this time the F-89J was replaced 
with the F-106A Delta Dart and F-101B Voodoo. The F-106A carried 
one MB-1 Genie and a new missile, the Falcon GAR-11, also nuclear 
capable. The F-101B carried two MB-1 Genies.25 The nuclear Falcon 
could be loaded five to a cell in the Multi-Cubicle Magazine Storage 
buildings which meant that one building could house one squadron’s 
worth of these weapons.26
FROM ARROW TO VOODOO, 1958-60
The r c a f  still had its CF-100 force deployed but with conventional 
armament, the chances of successfully engaging Soviet bombers were 
low. n o r a d  doctrine focused on fighting the air battle as far north 
and away from population centres and s a c  bases as possible. The s a c  
base complex at this time included a line of bases from Montana to 
Maine, within 50 miles of the Canadian border. An agreement was 
struck so that US Air Force interceptors equipped with MB-1 Genies 
could operate in Canadian airspace under certain conditions.27 
The agreement stipulated that “ [USAF] planes so armed will enter
24 < www.usaf-nav-history.com/Stories/nucnavs.html> “Air Transport Nuclear Navs.”
25 Marcel Size Knaack, Post-World War II Fighters 1945-1973 (Washington DC : 
Office of US Air Force History, 1986), 150-154, 208-221.
26 FOIA, “ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition, 
Control and Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963.”
27 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 64-65.
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Canadian air space only in the event an air defence warning yellow 
or red is declared. In such an event the USA planes will confine their 
activities in the main to Canadian territory bordering the Great 
Lakes and extending northwards to about 50 degrees north latitude.” 
MB-1 equipped interceptors “will be authorized by the Canadian 
government to land or take off from Canadian bases in the territory 
over which they have to operate.”28 This was an interim measure 
until the CF-105 Arrow squadrons, equipped with nuclear weapons, 
became available.
The need for Canadian access to nuclear weapons was bolstered by 
a 1958 n o r a d  threat assessment. The predominant scenario consisted 
of “two types of attacks against this continent -  in 1960 the attack 
will be a manned attack by infiltration to achieve surprise aimed at 
the strike force of s a c . This will be followed within 8 to 24 hours by a 
mass raid over the North Pole of again manned bombers against both 
s a c  bases and centres of population.” It was understood in n o r a d  
after Sputnik that missiles would become the preeminent strategic 
weapon, but not before 1965. After that, the “threat is envisaged as 
a surprise attack by i c b m ’s  attacking primarily s a c  bases and missile 
sites, followed again by a mass raid of manned bombers over the 
Pole.”29 n o r a d  envisioned a layered air defence consisting of manned 
fighters, area defence missiles, and point defence missiles.
Within weeks of the 1958 n o r a d  threat assessement, the Canadian 
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, requested a 
study of r c a f  nuclear weapons requirements. The focus of the study 
was on MB-1 weapons and the CF-105. The study posited two to four 
MB-1s per Arrow for a total of 560 to 1000 MB-1s.
Other nuclear weapons for which the r c a f  will have a requirement if 
present air defence proposals are approved are Bomarc and perhaps a 
nuclear warhead [for] Sparrow II or a GAR 1Y air-to-air guided missile 
with a nuclear warhead. The total number of Bomarc missiles is 120 
though no decision has been taken as to whether all of these will have 
nuclear warheads.28 930
28 LAC RG 24 vol.112 096 107.4.v.1, 22 February 1957, “message CANAIRHED to 
CANAIRDEF.”
29 DHH, The Max Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary, 30 May 1958.
30 ATI (25 July 1958) Aide Memoire for Chief of the Air Staff, “Requirements for 
Nuclear Weapons.”
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The CF-105 project was cancelled in February 1959. At that time 
the American Bomarcs were slowly becoming available. The first 
F-106A squadron deployed to Gieger a f b  in Washington in May 1959 
with a rapid build up to 275 aircraft by late 1960. The first F-101B 
squadron stood up at Otis a f b  in Massachusetts on 5 January 1959, 
with 17 squadrons deployed by December 1960.31 With no CF-105 
and thus no nuclear capability, Canada was essentially defended by 
American. The Diefenbaker government’s inability to accept that 
Canada needed nuclear weapons to maintain sovereignty led to a 
variety of policy gyrations that substantially delayed the proper 
force structure and participation in the n o r a d  air defence plan.32
After the CF-105 cancellation, the Eisenhower administration 
took steps to request that nuclear weapons be stored at Goose Bay 
and Stephenville for the u s a f  F-106A squadrons operating there.33 
This played into the rapidly building policy morass and slowed 
progress down on all fronts as anti-nuclear elements in External 
Affairs generated linkage between those weapons and an existing 
Goose Bay storage issue relating to Strategic Air Command dating 
back to 1950.
Air defence commanders on both sides of the border, who were 
dealing with real threats generated by an decreasingly stable global 
environment over Berlin, met to have discuss a ‘cross servicing 
policy’ between the u s a f  a d c  and the r c a f  a d c . These arrangements 
permitted “the recovery and turn-around of USAF AD C  aircraft at 
R C A F stations.”34 Nothing was mentioned regarding weapons and 
armament but the implications of this precautionary measure are 
obvious in light of the previous 1957 MB-1 overflight arrangement.
Eventually the Diefenbaker government agreed to acquire the 
F-101B Voodoo in March 1961. In the interim, however, there were 
discussions regarding the aircraft’s nuclear capability and Canadian 
requirements. The r c a f  was prepared to establish five F-101B Voodoo 
squadrons with 60 aircraft. A  total of 312 MB-1s were required to
31 Knaack, Post-World War II Fighters 1945-1973, 150-154, 217-218.
32 Again, this is discussed in great detail in the author’s Learning to Love the Bomb: 
Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1951-1970 (Dulles : Potomac 
Books, 2007).
33 DHH Raymont Collection, file 996, message External Ottawa to Washington DC, 
“Storage of Defensive Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base.”
34 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (19 Feb 1960) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
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equip this force “based on a USAF formula of 2.6 sorties per aircraft 
with 2 MB-1s being carried per aircraft.”35
The issue now revolved around the Diefenbaker government’s 
policy backtracking on nuclear weapons. Believing that Canada could 
punch above her weight and play a role in global disarmament talks, 
elements in the government convinced the Prime Minister to not agree 
to sign the necessary agreements with the United States to access 
nuclear weapons for Bomarc and other systems.36 At the same time, 
however, Cabinet agreed to initiate those negotiations, stipulating 
that “preparations should continue to enable the Canadian forces to 
have the vehicles, missiles, bases, training and other requirements to 
enable them to be ready to use nuclear weapons to be acquired from 
the United States under joint control arrangements if and when the 
adoption of these weapons is considered necessary.”37
The r c a f  was now confronted with mounting a crash programme 
to accept the CF-101B Voodoo and the Bomarc into its force 
structure. It was not simply a matter of taking possession of 60 
aircraft and 60 missile airframes. They needed bases, maintenance 
programmes, communications and command and control systems. 
As nuclear weapons were integral to their operational capability, the 
specialized aspects of these three elements needed to be understood. 
Unfortunately, access to the specifics of that American information 
was not possible without a signed agreement. The r c a f  was forced 
to use all of its resources to develop what amounted to speculation 
about was required in these three areas for the interceptors to be 
nuclearized if the government signed off on the agreement. This took 
place while trouble was again brewing over Berlin.
RCAF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE GROUNDWORK, 19 6 1-6 2
The last half of 1961 was a scramble to integrate the C F -io iB ’s and 
Bomarc into the r c a f . Within days of the decision to acquire the 
Voodoos, the chief of the air staff was informed that “Agreement on
35 ATI (3 November i960) COR to VCAS, “Aide Memoire RCAF Requirements for 
Nuclear Weapons.”
36 ATI (25 November i960) message External Ottawa to Washington DC, 
“Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.”
37 ATI (6 December i960) Record of Cabinet Decision, “Nuclear Weapons Policy.”
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a basic plan for positioning warheads on R C A F Bomarc bases was 
reached between the USAF and RCA F in March 1961 and has been 
the basis of RCA F and USAF preparatory actions.” That led to 
advanced movement with the US Air Force Special Weapons Center 
to implement nuclear command and control systems in North Bay.38 
This “working agreement” passed some but not all information 
on “minimal control, custody and security requirements” for the 
Bomarc bases so they could be constructed.39 It was “recommended 
that agreement and approval of the technical specifications and 
programme implications be pursued through channels now existing 
between the Bomarc System Project Office [section redacted].”40 
Indeed, as the Air Member for Technical Services noted later, “You 
will recall that this type of information in respect of Bomarc was 
obtained in the form of a draft annex to the Bomarc Operational 
Employment Plan. This annex, incidentally, contains much more 
than construction information and is in effect the technical agreement 
or technical agreement that would be concluded as a supplementary 
agreement to any general agreement on the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by the RCAF.”41
One important item in the back channel was the specifications 
for the Bomarc warhead security and maintenance building. The 
detailed aspects of this structure gave away a lot of Restricted 
Data information on the warhead itself,42 so what was passed to the 
Canadians was a sketch labeled “Floor Plan for Canadian Ordnance 
Facility.”43 This crucial piece of information allowed a head-start on 
construction.
Long line communications were established between the two 
Canadian Bomarc sites and facilities in the United States. The La 
Macaza site was connected to the n o r a d  s a g e  Direction Center in 
Bangor, Maine. The North Bay site was connected to a similar site
38 ATI (11 October 1961) memo to CAS, “Lead Times-Nuclear Weapons Systems.”
39 ATI (11 April 1961) memo to CCE, “Bomarc-Facilities Related to Installing 
Nucler Warheads at North Bay and La Macaza.”
40 ATI (7 April 1961) CAS to Air Member CJS(W) “Bomarc-Facilities and Support 
for Nuclear Warheads.”
41 ATI (24 November 1961) memo AMTS to CAS, “Nuclear Weapons-CF101B.”
42 This conclusion is based on the author’s survey of the North Bay Bomarc 
site, specifically the warhead maintanence building. The markings on the walls 
alone convey what would have been Atomic Energy Commission Secret-Formerly 
Restricted Data.
43 Sketch acquired under ATI.
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The Douglas M B-1 Genie served for nearly twenty years as Canada’s main nuclear air defence 
weapon. [National Museum of Nuclear Science and History]
located in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Most important, the North 
Bay site established a “logistics circuit” with Griffiss Air Force Base 
in Rome, New York.44 The estimate was that in two weeks data could 
flow between North Bay and the Sault Ste. Marie Direction Centre 
once everything was hooked up.45 At the same time there was a 
meeting at Hill Air Force Base, Utah to finalize the Bomarc logistics 
support plan.46
Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, however, was agitated about the 
lack of access to warheads “in view of the circumstances ... as well 
as the dangerous international situation we now face.” He was blunt 
with Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness: “On or about 1 
May 62 the North Bay Bomarc squadron will be fully operational if 
warheads have been provided. If no warheads are available this unit 
will be useless.” As for the C F  101B, “Without its nuclear armament 
[line redacted] From an over-all North American point of view, the 
destruction of any number of bombers short of their targets would 
be worthwhile, but nevertheless the situation is unsatisfactory in that 
the kill [line redacted]. This is clearly a waste of a most expensive
44 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (14 April 1961) Divisional Items of Interest.
45 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (28 April 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
46 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (21 April 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
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interceptor and therefore patently unpalatable to the [line redacted].” 
Campbell was likely referring to the high probability of destruction 
of the interceptor and its crew if they tried to shoot down a Soviet 
bomber loaded with barometrically-fused nuclear weapons, and then 
detonated by some form of ‘dead hand’ system as the aircraft lost 
altitude.47
But where should the incoming C F -io iB ’s be based? And what 
special facilities were needed for handling M B-i Genies, if Canada 
got access to them? With the Bomarc sites under construction, the 
r c a f  refocused on the Voodoo problem. The Director of Armament 
Engineering was told that the Voodoo bases “from which it is intended 
to scramble the aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard” were Comox, 
BC; North Bay; Uplands (Ottawa); Bagotville and Val d’Or, Quebec; 
and Chatham, New Brunswick.48
In July 1961, a u s a f  mobile training team came to r c a f  Station 
Uplands two days before the first C F -io iB ’s were supposed to arrive. 
u s a f  transport aircraft from Hill a f b  brought spare parts while 
another aircraft from Griffiss a f b  delivered “loose equipment.”49 u s a f  
personnel from Hill a f b  arrived at Uplands and North Bay to discuss 
details of various procedures. Word arrived that Bomarc missiles for 
446 Surface-to-Air Missile Squadron in North Bay would come off 
the production line in October. Boeing technicians installed them on 
24 November i96i.B0
Meanwhile, n o r a d  asked r c a f  Air Defence Command to do its 
utmost to achieve “increased effectiveness during the present period 
of tension” in the fall of i96i as the Berlin Crisis got worse and the 
Soviets airdropped and detonated the largest thermonuclear weapon 
ever conceived.51 On i2 October, i i  C F -io iB ’s arrived in Canada, 
some months later than originally scheduled. r c a f  pilots, some of 
who were already training with US Air Force F -ioiB  squadrons, 
started to work up the newcomers at Namao. r c a f  C-i30 and C -ii9  
transports flew to American sites and airlifted material for the CF- 
io iB  programme to r c a f  Station Comox.52 r c a f  Station Uplands 47895012
47 ATI (8 May ig6i) lett CAS to MND, “Lead Times-Nuclear Weapons System.”
48 ATI (23 June ig6i) memo, Acting DarmEng to DAProg.
49 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (2i July ig6i) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
50 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (i5 September ig6i) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest; 
DHH file 79/429 vol.io (9 December i96i) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
51 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (i5 September i96i) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
52 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (2o October i96i) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest ;
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finally received its first CF 101B Voodoos in December. r c a f  
transports also picked up 85 conventional G A R  2A missiles from the 
Hughes plant in Tucson, Arizona, and the six available aircraft were 
armed by 18 December.53
The lack of Quick Reaction Alert (q r a ) areas and special 
ammunition storage (s a s ) sites presented the main problem for the 
Canadian aircraft. The MB-1 required highly specialized security, 
communications, and maintenance facilities. The Bomarc project 
office was willing to bend the rules for the Canadians, but the r c a f  
did not yet have the same leverage for the CF-101B. Those back 
channels had to be activated all over again. The Air Member for 
Technical Services informed the Chief of the Air Staff that “we think 
we have enough information to undertake preliminary design of the 
buildings [but] our architectural staff has some unsatisfied queries.”54
The need to get the CF-101B force programme moving now 
outpaced Treasury Board’s ability to respond to the r c a f ’s  confused 
request for funds. Somehow, the funding priority for the s a s  and q r a  
sites was allocated Category C instead of Category A. Category A 
included items like married quarters drainage at r c a f  Station Moose 
Jaw. It took an irate Chief of the Air Staff’s intervention to right this 
error.55 Indeed, Campbell ordered his staff to assemble a detailed case 
for presentation to the minister for the possibility of deploying MB-1 
for the CF-101B’s at r c a f  Station Uplands (Ottawa) in February 
1962. This was labeled a ‘paper exercise’ to see what could be done 
and how long it would actually take. It was likely not a happy new 
year for the staff.56
“e m e r g e n c y  c o n d i t i o n s ” : s p r i n g  1962
While the r c a f  beavered away, the anti-nuclear elements in the 
Diefenbaker government continued to delay the signing of the formal 
nuclear weapons agreement with the United States. While preparing
DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (3 November 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
53 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (9 Dec 61) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest; DHH file 
79/429 vol.10 (15 December 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
54 ATI (24 November 1961) memo AMTS to CAS, “Nuclear Weapons - CF101B.”
55 ATI (21 November 1961) memo CAS to VCAS, “Nuclear Weapons - 101B.”
56 ATI (29 December 1961) memo D/VCAS to DPIM, “RCAF and Nuclear 
Armament.”
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material to for the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, Air 
Chief Marshal Frank Miller, to make the case to Minister of National 
Defence Douglas Harkness, Campbell suddenly realized that 
“somebody might mention to the Minister the possibility of nuclear 
warheads for both the Bomarcs and the MB-1s remaining in storage 
at selected points [line redacted] to be available for deployment to 
Canada under emergency conditions only.”57
The acting Vice Chief of the Air Staff dismissed the problem, 
asserting that “We all know that there would be an unacceptable time 
requirement in doing this, but the C A S wishes it to be spelled out.”58 
And it was. Campbell explained to Miller that there were several 
factors in providing Bomarc with nuclear warheads. All nuclear 
warheads were individually numbered and under the control of the 
Atomic Energy Commission and subject to their rules, regulations 
and safety procedures. Additionally, there were only two special 
transport squadrons to move weapons around so it would take ninety 
days for the Bomarc sites to be ready.59 Most important:
It is obvious that the technicians who handle and fuse the atomic 
warheads must be very highly trained and their skills must be kept up 
to date through constant practice at live sites. During an emergency in 
which the Air Defence forces of North America might be involved these 
people would be in great demand by the USAF. We could hardly expect 
the United States under such conditions of national alert to consent to 
an arrangement as outlined the provision of the necessary personnel and 
air transport capability on a standby basis without positive assurance 
they would be able to perform a useful military function would only 
tend to degrade, if not weaken the USAF effort.60
Campbell concluded that “the separation of the nuclear warheads 
from their vehicles by any great distance is simply not acceptable as 
a military operation.”61
57 ATI (22 January 1962) memo AVCS to CplansI, “Nuclear Weapons.” The 
ridiculously redacted line is “in the USA.”
58 Ibid.
59 DHH Raymont Collection file 303, (16 February 1962) memo CAS to CCOS, 
“Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons-Bomarc.”
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Yet, did the r c a f  explore the options with their counterparts? 
From the available sources, the answer is no. And they had their 
information on the special air transport squadrons wrong: there were 
three of them, not two. What is clear is that Campbell and Miller did 
not want to give the Diefenbaker government an easy, but risky, way 
out of the dilemma the politicians themselves created.
NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE VOODOOS, 1962
The 1961 list of potential operating locations for the r c a f  Voodoos 
remained in play until better information on where the squadrons 
fit into n o r a d  planning became available. The first issue related to 
the Quick Reaction Alert (q r a ) facilities. A  q r a  facility consisted 
of a pair of hangers connected by living quarters for the pilots and 
ground crew situated on a special concrete extension attached to the 
runway of an air base or airfield. The size of these facilities depended 
upon the level of alert deemed necessary and feasible to react to a 
Soviet air threat.
n o r a d  determined the capacity for the new Canadian q r a  
facilities. Each squadron assigned to n o r a d  had to maintain a pair 
of interceptors equipped with non-nuclear weapons on five-minute 
alert for an identification sortie. This was usually a “peacetime” 
event. There were then three alert levels: Alpha, Bravo and Charlie. 
Alpha,the normal level of alert, called for a pair of nuclear-armed 
aircraft on 15 minute alert. Bravo had six nuclear-armed aircraft 
on 15 minute alert. Charlie, or maximum alert, placed all combat- 
ready aircraft on five minute alert. At that point the existence of 
the q r a  facility was moot. Canadian requirements, therefore, were 
determined to be a shelter for a pair of aircraft on 15-minute alert 
with “hard stands” for four aircraft on fifteen minute alert.62
In practice, the distinctive “Y ” shaped hardstands were equipped 
with four enclosed shelters, each of which contained a pair of CF- 
101B’s, two conventionally-armed for identification sorties and two 
with M B-1’s, plus additional ramp space for the Bravo-level aircraft.63
62 ATI (24 January 1962) memo A/VCAS to AMTS, “Nuclear Weapons - CF101B 
Aircraft.”
63 Author’s site survey of former RCAF QRA facilities at North Bay and Uplands.
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q r a  facilities were located at Comox, North Bay, Uplands, Bagotville, 
Val d’Or, St. Hubert and Chatham.64
The r c a f  at this juncture was still sorting out the operational 
concept, which was very different from that for the CF-100. In the 
new scheme, there were going to be five CF-101B squadrons deployed 
as follows:
409 Squadron: Comox
410 Squadron: Uplands
414 Squadron: North Bay
416 Squadron: Chatham
425 Squadron: Bagotville
In January 1962, the r c a f  concluded that “The location of 
Uplands, in a major Canadian target area, precludes its use as a 
base for CF-101B aircraft immediately [if] war is imminent or has 
commenced.”65 What to do? There was Val d’Or, an austere remote 
forward operating location in central Quebec. Establishing facilities 
for a whole squadron and its personnel and dependents would be an 
ambitious and costly undertaking. The pressure, however, was on to 
get proposals through Treasury Board so q r a  facilities and special 
ammunition storage sites were programmed for both Uplands and 
Val d’Or.
The next hurdle was the nature and layout of the s a s  sites. 
Here the US Atomic Energy Act and the lack of a government-to- 
government agreement stymied the r c a f . Like the Bomarc sites, 
warhead maintenance had to be carried out by an American custodial 
detachment in a secure facility. r c a f  attempts to activate back 
channels similar to those used for the Bomarc warhead maintenance 
building became problematic in 1962, but not for reasons of secrecy.
The drawings for the existing standard u s a f  Multi-Cubicle 
Magazine Storage (m c m s ) buildings were duly delivered to r c a f  
architects and engineers sometime before May 1962. The Canadians 
learned on the back channel, however, that the m c m s  was now 
considered obsolete and there were safety concerns. A  new design was 
winding its way through the labyrinthine bureaucratic bowels of the
64 Author’s survey of former QRA sites using Google Earth.
65 ATI (24 January 1962) memo A/VCAS to AMTS, “Nuclear Weapons-CF101B 
Aircraft.”
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A  Special Ammunition Storage facility was constructed at RCAF Station North Bay and was 
earmarked for use during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. [Author]
Defense Atomic Support Agency and Joint Services Explosives Safety 
Board in the United States. The new design was not approved yet 
and its dimensions were still classified as Formerly Restricted Data.66
In effect, the Americans were changing the standard at exactly 
the time that the r c a f  was in the process of implementing s a s  sites. 
But Canada could not obtain the latest essential information because 
the Diefenbaker government continued to stall on the agreement 
that would give them detailed access. This state of affairs led to 
a construction anomaly at r c a f  bases associated with CF-101B 
operations. The first two bases expected to get Voodoos were Uplands 
and North Bay. Using what information they had, r c a f  engineers 
constructed special ammunition storage sites at both bases. These 
were unique Canadian-designed facilities. The Uplands s a s  had two 
large rectangular bunkered magazines and a smaller bunker with five 
door-bays, each large enough to contain two Genie MF-9 trailers. 
The fourth building was a missile maintenance building equipped 
with drive through doors, a second large bunkered room, and a large
66 ATI (14 June 1962) memo D/AMTS to CCE, “CF101B Program-QRA and 
SAS Special Armament Facilities” ; (17 May 1962) CCOS to CCJS(W), “CF101B 
Program-Arrangements for Special Weapons.” See also ATI (8 June 1962) message 
CANAIRWASH to CANAIRHED, “Special Purpose Explosive Storage.”
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rail system for moving larger heavy objects from the drive-through 
area to the large room. The North Bay site possessed only the two 
rectangular magazines and it appears as though construction was 
halted before the other two structures could be built.67
While the North Bay and Uplands facilities were under 
construction, however, the planning on where Val d’Or fit into the 
operational scheme was finalized. Val d’Or, with its forward location, 
was ideally suited to taking on the brunt of any air attack directed 
at the target complexes in the “Niagara Triangle.” The initial idea 
was to maintain a pair of C F -io iB ’s on alert with minimal first-line 
maintenance until proper s a s  facilities could be completed.68
The follow-on concept looked towards maintaining a Voodoo 
squadron at Uplands and then deploying it to Val d’Or on an alert to 
augment the alert aircraft stationed there. By July 1962 this concept 
solidified whereby squadrons at North Bay and Uplands would 
share this commitment. The Val d’Or alert aircraft would handle 
identification flights with no M B-is aboard. Whatever squadron was 
not providing the identification aircraft would maintain four aircraft 
on 15 minutes alert loaded with M B-i. Once the s a s  facilities were 
built at Val d’Or, four would be on alert there, while four Voodoos 
would remain on nuclear alert at either North Bay or Uplands.69
DEADLOCK, 1962
The Diefenbaker government’s indecision on signing the warhead 
access agreement was starting to wear on the r c a f  leadership by the 
late summer of 1962. This was “an impossible situation,” according 
to Air Commodore E.M. Reyno, in a long letter to the Vice Chief of 
the Air Staff:
One of the principle reasons why the Government will not agree to 
accepting special weapons, rightly or wrongly, is that there is a large 
body of public opinion in Canada which wants Canada to remain out
67 Author’s survey of former SAS facilities at CFB North Bay and Ottawa 
International Airport.
68 ATI (21 August 1962) DAPorg to DCE, “Nuclear Weapon Planning - Val d ‘Or.”
69 ATI (26 July 1962) CAS to AOC ADC, “Operational Posture Location of 410 
Squadron.”
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of the “nuclear club.” This group opinion will be respected even more 
in the future because of the Government’s current minority opinion in 
the House.70
Reyno wanted to mount a publicity campaign to counter this 
thinking with facts. The weapons were defensive in nature, air 
defence was part of the deterrent system, and “The only means of 
destroying an enemy bomber with a load of special weapons on board 
and without subjecting ourselves to fall-out danger is to ‘cook’ it with 
a nuclear weapon high in the air.”
Reyno’s frustration echoed that of the rest of the r c a f  :
We have sat with the present situation long enough in my opinion, and 
in spite of the fact that some of the best military writing I have ever 
seen has gone forward to the Cabinet on behalf of the cause and we are 
even worse off now than we were five years ago -  because people are 
laughing at us now because we have carriers but no weapons.71
Reyno told his superiors:
[I] know the CAS discussed ‘Defensive Weapons’ with the Minister but 
the publicity campaign idea didn’t catch on. The former CAS wouldn’t 
buy the idea we should help the gov’t out of a dilemma of its own 
making, I still think we should.72
Campbell approached Harkness on the issue on 19 August 1962 and 
argued that, “the best one might hope for would be an eventual 
agreement that would involve storage of the warheads in the 
United States, for transfer to Canada in an emergency.”73 Campbell 
emphatically noted that Canada “must also be prepared to consider 
returning the Bomarcs and F-101B interceptors to the United States 
and, in effect, turning over the air defence of Canada to [section 
redacted].”74 The redacted section likely referred to American Air 
Defense Command’s interceptors.
70 ATI (1 August 1962) memo A/VCAS to VCAS “Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.”
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. See minute #7.
73 ATI (10 August 1962) CAS to MND, “Nuclear Weapons for Air Defence.”
Ibid.
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There were potentially lethal dangers associated with an emergency "just in time delivery" 
policy. This is the remains o f a US A ir Force C -124 Globemaster II transport carrying three 
M k 39 bombs that crashed near Barksdale Air Force Base in 1959. [National Museum of Nuclear 
Science and History]
Air Marshal Miller provided a detailed treatise to Harkness that 
remains unavailable to the public. In effect Miller explained that 
“Such a belief must, it would seem, be based on the idea that there 
is nothing basically different in the handling procedures required for 
a nuclear warhead as compared say, to an artillery shell... . This, of 
course is not the case.” Miller implies that emergency airlift “could 
be dangerous to our own forces or population.”75
The main issue in a “just in time” emergency delivery scenario, 
Miller explained, was time. “[A]n attack could come at anytime and 
with little warning, possibly as little as one hour or even less.” As 
a result, “it is the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that storage of the 
warheads on other than the bases from which they would be used 
does not make military sense [paragraph redacted].” In the strongest 
possible language, Miller asserted “The possession of the carriers 
without the armament to exploit them properly weakens the entire 
North American defence system and also exposed Canada and the 
Canadian armed forces to ridicule.”76
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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In the wake of this impasse, the Air Council unilaterally decided 
to make six CF-101B’s of the Operational Training Unit at r c a f  
Namao (Edmonton) “combat ready.” Should they tell the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee first and wait for the government to sign the access 
agreement? Or should they get c o s c  approval, and then make a 
“formal application to the US Air Force under the canopy of the 
existing Cabinet directive respecting the preparedness of nuclear 
weapons systems?” Six CF-101B’s were placed on a “Ready” status.77
At the same time, ten Bomarc missiles arrived at La Macaza 
on 15 September and communications and integration tests were 
underway between La Macaza and the Bangor Air Defence Sector’s 
SAGE computer. 425 Squadron assumed n o r a d  alert status on 1 
October while 414 Squadron was in the process of redeploying to 
North Bay. This was on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND EMERGENCY ACCESS
The details of Canada’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis are 
available in two other works.78 For our purposes however, this section 
focuses on the issue of the air defence system’s readiness. On 24 
October, deputy commander-in-chief n o r a d , Air Chief Marshal Roy 
Slemon, contacted r c a f  Air Defence Command and informed them 
that c i n c  n o r a d , wearing his American “hat” placed the American 
component of n o r a d , the Continental Air Command and thus US 
Air Force Air Defense Command at Defence Condition (d e f c o n ) 
3, weapons status Delta. Wearing his coalition command “hat” he 
now asked Canada for three things : to please move the r c a f  a d c  
status to the equivalent level of alert; disperse the interceptor force; 
and that “n o r a d  should be allowed to bring in nuclear weapons if 
necessary into Canada and start the arming process.”79 As Slemon 
later recounted,
It was obviously vital to take preventative action before the Cuban
missiles became operational with nuclear warheads, the timing of
77 DHH file 76/264 (29 August 1962) Air Council Minutes.
78 Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered 
(Toronto: CISS, 1993) and Maloney, Learning to Love The Bomb.
79 Hendrick Papers, “Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
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which was exceedingly difficult to determine or forecast precisely. If the 
missiles had become operational, it takes little imagination to visualize 
the blackmail, pressures and threats to which we all would have been
subjected....  Foremost in the minds of all of us, or course, was the
real danger that the Russians, when suddenly confronted openly with 
the knowledge that their big Cuban venture was collapsing, might, in 
frustration, react in some lunatic manner against the North American 
continent. This grave possibility demanded that our NORAD defences 
be readied.80 8123
Miller met with Diefenbaker, Green, and Harkness. “They didn’t 
even touch the question,” according to a report of the meeting, “they 
just looked at it and bowed away from the question of nuclear tips.” 
Miller contacted Slemon at n o r a d  h q  in Colorado and told him “we 
really didn’t go anywhere on that.” Miller recommended that c i n c  
n o r a d  put in a request to the Canadian government “to allow the 
arming of the F-102 squadron at Goose Bay with G A R  11’s and 
a detachment at Harmon” to “introduce the subject.” An official 
request arrived in minutes.81
The Chiefs of Staff Committee met with Harkness. Campbell 
suggested that more and better information on how quickly the 
Bomarcs and CF-101B’s could be armed be acquired. During that 
time the d e f c o n  in the United States changed to d e f c o n  2 for 
Strategic Air Command and certain naval forces. Harkness went to 
Diefenbaker who reluctantly agreed to place Canadian air defence 
forces on the equivalent of d e f c o n  3.82
After further communication, Slemon “at his own initiative called 
up about an hour later” and told the r c a f  leadership that the fastest 
way of arming was to have the r c a f  C F -io iB ’s “come down and be 
armed at American bases. We could do that, and we think it could 
be done quite quickly.”83 Slemon relayed American concerns that “to 
put a capability up in Canada of arming them up on Canadian bases 
would take a great deal of work because the key problem would be 
the training of the technicians.” As for the Bomarcs, “they reckoned
80 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, “Extract from Personal Letter 3 March 1965 
from Air Marshal Slemon to General Foulkes.”
81 Hendrick Papers, “Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
82 NAC MG 32 (B19) Vol.57, Douglas Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and 
the Political Crisis Which Arose from It In January and February 1963.”
83 Hendrick Papers, “Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
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This is a C F -101B in a Quick Reaction Alert facility equipped with Falcon air-to-air missiles 
sometime in the early 1960s before M B -1 Genies were stored in Canada. [Department of 
National Defence]
that within six days of any starting time zero they could have half 
a squadron capability and within nine days the Bomarc squadron 
could fully operations for nuclear tips.”84
At some point after this temporary MB-1 storage areas were 
delineated at CF-101B bases, though these weapons were not 
deployed to them from American storage sites. As for the Bomarcs, a 
number of W  40 warheads were flown into North Bay on u s a f  C-124 
transports and were mounted in the missiles but their full capability 
was not realized when the Cuban Missile Crisis wound down in late 
October.85
Badly shaken by the crisis, the Diefenbaker government ministers 
met and “unanimously agreed that we should at once reopen 
negotiations with the United States.” Cabinet decided that “For the 
weapons in Canada -  the Bomarcs and the C F -iois -  we were to try 
to get an agreement under which the nuclear warheads, or essential
84 Hendrick Papers, “Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
85 This information was provided to the author by Lieutenant-General A. Chester 
Hull.
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parts of them, would be held in the United States but could be put on 
the weapons in Canada in a matter of minutes or hours.”86
Consulting with Slemon in n o r a d  on 2-3 November while 
Strategic Air Command remained at d e f c o n  287 and n o r a d  forces 
at d e f c o n  3 Weapons State Charlie,88 Chief of the Air Staff Larry 
Dunlap looked at the arguments before briefing Harkness and Green. 
The n o r a d  staff’s response on the Bomarcs remains unnecessarily 
restricted today but for the C F -io iB ’s the staff concluded that:
by flying CF101 aircraft to selected USAF bases, uploading with MB-is 
and flying back to Canadian bases in an operational configuration [is] a 
highly undesirable course of action to NORAD since it interferes with 
and reduces the alert posture and the already marginal capability for 
defence in depth; and could undesirably concentrate our limited forces 
at a time when survival Dispersal measures might be implemented.89
These measures assumed “that the R C A F is trained and provided 
with adequate equipment [redacted].” (This was likely related to 
the loading equipment for the weapons). c i n c  n o r a d  felt “strongly 
that the only posture which is justifiable is one that provides all 
Bomarcs and all C F io is  with an on-site quick reaction operational 
capability.” And, not incidentally when one was dealing with nuclear 
weapons, “crash action of the nature herein contemplated to provide 
nuclear capability to the r c a f  forces will generate weapons handling 
risks greater than would be the case if Canadian policy now enabled 
weapons to be on site in properly constructed facilities at appropriate 
bases in Canada.”90
It is not clear how much Canadian military leaders or Canadian 
politicians knew in ig62 about the nature and extent of US Air Force 
experiences with nuclear accidents in the i95os. During that decade 
there were i4 accidents involving bombers loaded with nuclear weapons
86 NAC MG 32 (Bi9) Vol.57, Douglas Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and 
the Political Crisis Which Arose from It In January and February i963.”
87 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, (6 November i962) memo CGS to dl “States 
of Readiness of US Forces.”
88 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, (5 November i962) memo CGS to CCOS, 
“Military Measures Taken During the Cuban Crisis.”
89 ATI (3 November i962) message CINCNORAD to CANAIRHED, personal to 
Dunlap from Slemon.
90 Ibid.
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or components and two accidents involving C-i24’s belonging to the 
3079th Aviation Depot Wing special transport squadrons carrying 
nuclear weapons and components.91 Consequently, the American side 
of n o r a d  could speak with some authority on the dangers of hastily 
transporting nuclear weapons.
Dunlap briefed high-level Canadian officials during the first 
week of November. Emergency deployment “is a time consuming 
process. The timings I shall give you are based on the most ideal 
circumstances.” There was no existing training agreement: one 
had to be signed first “to provide the basis for the retraining and 
[redacted] so that these resources would be available on short notice 
for movement to North Bay and LaMacaza and to provide for the 
training of the r c a f  element of the warhead loading crews” before 
“strategic or tactical warning.” Then “at some stage in the period of 
rising tension, a decision would have to be arrived at by the Canadian 
Government to request the nuclear warheads -  this to be followed by 
an approach to the United States -  this, in turn, by the issuance of 
instructions by the [lines redacted].”92
Dunlap asked the most important question:
How much time is required for a decision to invite the United States 
to send nuclear weapons to Canada? You are far better judges of that 
than I. Let me merely say that, under certain circumstances of the day 
or night [lines redacted] then to that you must add your estimate of the 
time for a decision. For the purposes of this brief I will assume that this 
total operation could be accomplished in 1 hour plus decision time.93
Then:
Once this action has been cleared, the US manpower and equipment 
would have to marshaled, loaded into transport aircraft and [line 
redacted] which the nuclear weapons are to be drawn. This is a time­
consuming process under the best of conditions, even assuming that 
airlift would be despatched without delay and that weather conditions
91 Ibid.
92 ATI (13 November 1962) memo CAS to dl, “Time Factors-Delivery of Nuclear 
Weapons” and attached paper, “Nuclear Warheads : Time Factors Concerned with 
Their Delivery.”
93 Ibid.
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are favourable ... and assuming that the air transport bases are within 
30 minutes flying of the United States base where the nuclear load is 
earmarked.94
Unfortunately the documents describing the process and timings 
remain heavily redacted. Fortunately, however, Minister of National 
Defence Douglas Harkness explained in his papers that
The amount of warning time which could be counted on for a Russian 
air attack on North American was between two and three hours — thus 
to be satisfactory a system of delivery and installation of the nuclear 
warheads on Canadian weapons within two hours was essential. To 
accomplish this a large number of aircraft and hundreds of men would 
be required ... one which would seriously complicate the operation of 
the American bases where the warheads were held ... In addition of the 
weather conditions were bad, it might not work.95
Harkness concluded that
It was quite apparent that any such plan was impractical and far too 
costly and the only purpose it would serve would be to enable the 
Canadian Government to say no nuclear weapons were being held on 
Canadian soil. This, however, appeared to be Howard Green’s chief 
objective and he insisted on going over the times, men involved, and all 
the other details at great length, evidently with the hope of convincing 
himself and others that it was a workable scheme.96
An American team “went back home to see what essential parts of 
the warheads, small in size, could be kept in the US and flown up in 
an emergency [they] returned with a variety of schemes along these 
lines which materially cut down the cost and improved the time, but 
it was clear that none of them would provide a really satisfactory 
solution.”97
94 Ibid.
95 NAC MG 32 (B19) Vol.57, Douglas Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and 
the Political Crisis Which Arose from It In January and February 1963.”
96 Ibid.
Ibid.
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Where were the weapons that were earmarked for Canadian 
bases stored? The American bases that had nuclear weapons storage 
and were within short flight range of Canadian bases were: Duluth; 
K.I. Sawyer ; Kinchloe ; Wurtsmith ; Selfridge ; Griffiss ; Dow, and 
Loring. The chart depicts the estimated storage space and the 
aircraft types stationed at each base. The two bases that possessed 
notable excess storage capacity were K.I. Sawyer (at least 30 spaces 
for MB-1) and Griffiss (at least 60 spaces for MB-1). As for Loring 
it is unclear whether there were three, four, or six 30-bay structures. 
W  40 warheads, in their 55-gallon drum-like container, could easily 
be stored in any “igloo” bunker and did not require climate control. 
Griffiss, Wurtsmith, and Dow had this type of storage in location. 
Both Selfridge and Kinchloe operated F-106 squadrons, which may 
not have required all available 120 m c m s  spaces.98
Out west the closest bases with nuclear storage to stations Comox, 
Cold Lake and Namao were Gieger and McChord in Washington ; 
Glasgow and Great Falls, Montana ; and Minot, North Dakota. A 
healthy candidate to supply Comox is Geiger Field, with five buildings 
and 150 spaces for a single F-106 squadron.99
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM, 1963
In mid-November 1962, a US Air Force team inspected the La 
Macaza B o m a r c  site run by 447 s a m  Squadron. This inspection 
“was completed successfully with no major discrepancies.”100 By 
January 1963, the r c a f  leadership determined that the B o m a r c  and 
CF-101B squadrons “can be made operational with nuclear weapons 
very readily” even though the formal access agreement was not yet 
signed.101
The new timelines for operational capacity were now 19 weeks 
for the Bomarc sites and “no less that twelve months and possibly 
as much as eighteen months” for the CF-101B force which was
98 This is based on the author’s survey of MCMS structures at former USAF ADC 
interceptor bases.
99 Ibid.
100 DHH file 79/429 vol.12 (16 November 1962) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
101 ATI (18 January 1963) memo A/CAS to CplansI, “Nuclear Weapons : Time to 
Become Operational After Agreement Signed.”
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“determined by either the construction time for the s a s  and q r a  
facilities or [line redacted]” and the length of construction season.
The frustrations within n o r a d  were increasingly palpable as they 
re-assessed the events of October 1962. By April 1963 a request for 
acceptance of a fighter dispersal plan was mooted through lower level 
channels. This was not an emergency dispersal plan and the idea 
was to have nine squadrons deploy to Canadian air bases “on a 
continuing basis.”102
Such a request would have been anathema to the Diefenbaker 
government if they knew about it. At this point the relationship 
between Diefenbaker and Kennedy was non-existent. Diefenbaker’s 
behaviour towards Kennedy was so disproportionately poor that 
Kennedy frequently used profanity and Diefenbaker’s name in the 
same sentences to his advisors.103
In June 1963 Kennedy toured n o r a d  h q  where he was briefed by 
Slemon. This included a 20-minute mock battle depicting an attack 
on North America. The threat was based on 90 i c b m s , 20-30 missile­
launching submarines and 200 bombers with nuclear weapons:
It commenced with the cutting of the BMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System] Warning cable followed by a previous indication that 
the Soviet Long Range Air Force had been launched in large numbers 
and that there was an abnormal number of submarines concentrated 
on the Southern Coast of the United States. The first hostile act was 
the shooting down of an Early Warning aircraft of the Pacific barrier, 
the next was a BMEWS warning which built up rapidly but before 
impacts from these shots, which were aimed at all 4 quadrants could be 
realized there were nuclear explosions on both coasts presumed to come 
from submarines. As the battle built up the CinC contacted the Joint 
Chiefs War Room and the Ottawa War Room, reported the situation, 
indicated that he had increased his Alert to DEFCON 1, was flushing 
his fighters and asked for reaffirmation on the use of nuclear weapons. 
At the same time he advised SAC and CINCPAC [Commander-in­
Chief Pacific] of the situation. The Joint War Room in the States and 
Ottawa replied confirming the Presidential decision and the Canadian 
Prime Ministers decision to carry on and at this point the Deputy CinC 
[n o r a d ] brought the regions into the picture authorizing them to flush
102 DHH file 79/429 vol.12 (26 April 1963) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
103 DHH Hendrick Papers, ‘Presidential Visit to NORAD Headquarters, 8 June 1963.”
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and use their weapons. (It was this play which showed the regions were 
not brought into the picture until some 4 minutes after the original 
BMEWS warning, the time being taken for this high-level consultation 
and validation). The next hostile review was penetration of the DEW 
Line in large numbers with a predicted arrival in the [Zone of Interior] 
of 2% hours later. The exercise was then compressed in time by 3 hours 
and tracks were shown in large numbers along the Canada- US border 
entering all Sectors. Regions were asked to report their status which 
they did by telephone indicating that about % were operating from their 
ALCOPs [alternate command post] showing what losses they had of 
fighters on the ground and Bomarcs and NIKI [sic - NIKE] batteries 
to the nuclear attack and indicated that their success rate against the 
bombers was reasonable and that they had enough weapons to carry on. 
At this point the exercise was completed.104 105
c i n c  n o r a d  was “empowered to declare d e f c o n  1 based on tactical 
evidence on the board and having done so he could declare objects 
hostile based on circumstantial evidence or upon having obvious 
hostile intent. Under the two conditions of d e f c o n  1 and a declaration 
of an object as hostile he was authorized to shoot it down with 
nuclear weapons once it penetrated US air space that is within the 
3 mile limit.”106
Given these timelines, the emergency measures discussed so 
feverishly in November 1962 would not have been feasible. The level 
of communications disruption brought on by the initial stages of an 
attack would have made initiation of the process unlikely. In addition, 
the flight characteristics of the C-124 Globemaster II must be taken 
into account. “Old Shaky” was a large, slow, four-engine propeller 
aircraft with a maximum speed of 300 miles per hour.106
The only alternative would have been to move warheads by air to 
sites during the build-up of an international crisis. However, a Privy 
Council Office assessment concluded that:
I believe that the crisis showed that it would have been very difficult 
if not impossible to obtain nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 C-124 data comes from Boeing at : <http : //www.boeing.com/boeing/history/ 
mdc/globemaster.page>.
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a period of anticipated imminent attack. The main difficulty is the 
reluctance to exacerbate a tense international situation and to alarm 
opinion in Canada and abroad by taking such a step, which would 
be widely understood as revealing that the Canadian Government 
had good reason to believe, perhaps on secret evidence, that war was 
imminence and unavoidable.107
During the course of Kennedy’s n o r a d  visit, the Canadians reported:
there is some uncertainty as to exactly at what point the President 
authorizes the general use of nuclear defensive weapons against hostile 
objects. In practice DEFCON 1 would coincide with the general alerts 
which would arouse both the civil population would bring into play the 
retaliatory forces and course this would bring into play Presidential 
approval for the use of strategic defensive forces. It is inconceivable that 
DEFCON 1 would result in hostile action by Air Defence Command on 
its own and it is in this respect the system is interlocked.108
n o r a d  had to work around the problem. Until the agreement was 
signed in 1964, the plan called for deployment of 18 US Air Force 
F - io iB ’s to Chatham, Bagotville, and North Bay when d e f c o n  1 
was declared. At the service level, “It was agreed between General 
Aghan and Air Marshal Harvey that in the event of a real flap 
aircraft would deploy north loaded and south unloaded and if 
time permitted there could be a ferry service using fighters to lift 
the weapons dependent solely on the ground handling equipment 
available on the Canadian bases. This plan would be a hip pocket 
plan and not put in writing.”109
CONCLUSION
By 1963 Special Ammunition Storage Sites were constructed at 
Comox, BC, Val d ’Or and Bagotville, Quebec, and Chatham, New 
Brunswick. These new facilities replaced the multi-cubicle munitions
107 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, memo for Mr. Bryce, “Lessons of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.
108 Ibid.
109 DHH Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary 28 February 1964.
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storage buildings. There were two earth-covered buildings, each 
containing two rows of seven special lockers. The three sites each 
had approximately 28 lockers, storage for enough MB-1s to equip 
14 aircraft in each r c a f  CF-101B squadron.110 The two Canadian 
Bomarc sites each had 28 missiles, with W  40 warheads uploaded 
onto the airframes and a pair of spare warheads stored in the 
warhead custodian’s building. The W  40s arrived by u s a f  C-124 on 
the night of 3 January 1964. By 1965 US Air Force C-i24s arrived 
and handed over the MB-1 rockets with their W-25 warheads to the 
425 Munitions Maintenance Squadron detachments at the CF-101B 
bases. Emergency measures were, finally, no longer required.
In seeking to retain sovereignty, the Diefenbaker government 
compromised it. The decisions boiled down to undermining the 
larger deterrent system consisting of n o r a d  and s a c  for domestic 
political consumption or accepting the technical and temporal 
realities of nuclear air defence. That this debate took place during 
the most dangerous nuclear crisis of the period seriously questions the 
Canadian government’s competence. To have a nation’s air defence 
effectively in the hands of a neighbour, even an ally, was too much 
for the professional military leadership, and ultimately the Canadian 
voting population, to stomach.
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